The Journal of Entrepreneurial Finance
Volume 3
Issue 3 Fall 1994

Article 3

December 1994

Participation Financing as a Solution to the Agency Problem of
Perk Consumption in Small Firms
Hua Yu
University of Quebec

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.pepperdine.edu/jef

Recommended Citation
Yu, Hua (1994) "Participation Financing as a Solution to the Agency Problem of Perk Consumption in
Small Firms," Journal of Small Business Finance: Vol. 3: Iss. 3, pp. 215-227.
DOI: https://doi.org/10.57229/2373-1761.1156
Available at: https://digitalcommons.pepperdine.edu/jef/vol3/iss3/3

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Graziadio School of Business and Management at
Pepperdine Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in The Journal of Entrepreneurial Finance by an
authorized editor of Pepperdine Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
bailey.berry@pepperdine.edu.

Participation Financing as a Solution to the Agency
Problem o f Perk Consumption in Small Firms
Hua Yu

Although it has been suggested that participation financing may allow publiclytraded firms to reduce the agency cost of perk consumption, the effect of this
type of financing in small firms needs more discussion. The objective of the article
is to analyze the small firm effects on the effectiveness of the participation
financing in dealing with the agency problem of perk consumption. The partici
pation option gives outside investors less protection against the excessive entre
preneur perk consumption when the firm’s default risk is high. By contrast, the
option is more effective in firms with rapid growth or high levels of information
asymmetry and therefore high monitoring costs.

I. INTRODUCTION
Debt financing with the option of equity participation allows debtholders to
participate in the value appreciation of the firms they finance on a non-obligatory
basis. The participation may be full, as in the case of convertible debt where
a debtholder may convert all debt into equity, or partial as in the case of
straight debt financing with detachable warrants where a debtholder may buy
additional equity from the firm by exercising the warrants. More recentiy, the
development of mezzanine financing allows institutional holders of relatively
high risk loans to buy stock from the firm or to share the profit when the
venture is successful (Stacy, 1988).
The rationale of participation financing has already been discussed in a
number of studies. Among other things, the participation clause acts as a
sweetener to attract investors (Long & Sefcik, 1990). Participation financing
may also serve as a means to reduce the agency costs of perk consumption
(Bamea, Haugen, 8c Senbet, 1985). This paper focuses on the second aspect.
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In the absence of the participation option, the owner-manager of a leveraged
firm may have an incentive to consume more perquisites which will result in
increased agency costs (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). The utilization of a partici
pation financing contract, such as convertible bonds, allows outside investors to
hold a put option which acts to ofifeet the negative impact of owner-manager
perk consumption (Bamea, Haugan, 8c Senbet, 1985; Green, 1984).
The objective of this paper is to assess the effectiveness of participation
financing in reducing small firm agency costs of perk consumption. In terms
of their ownership structure, the sources of financing and the level of
information asymmetry, the financial circumstances of small firms are very
different from those of large firms; this often results in high levels of agency
costs (Ang, 1991a,b; Bink, Ennew, 8c Reed, 1992; Dunstant, Dwyer, 8c Helmes,
1992; Schnabel, 1992). It might serve the best interests of both small firm
owners and outside investors to reduce these costs. A num ber of studies have
already shown that some forms of financial contracting, among other things,
can effectively reduce the agency costs of small firms. For instance, a
well-designed stock option compensation scheme may reduce perk consump
tion and induce more efficient management efforts (Chua 8c Woodward,
1993; Mehran, 1992). On the other hand, the use of revolving asset-based
lending contracts is another way of reducing information asymmetry and
resolving agency problems (Constand, Osteryoung, & Nast, 1991). Moreover,
efficient monitoring activities with costs shared partially by the owner-manager may induce him to lower perk consumption (Yazdipour 8c Song, 1991).
Although participation financing may be considered as an alternative
method for dealing with agency problems, its effectiveness in financing small
firms cannot be taken for granted. Some special features of small firms may
have a decisive impact on the results of this particular form of financing. Due
to the absence of a secondary market, the stock of small firms is much less
liquid than that of large firms. Once investors decide to participate in the
ownership of a small firm, it will be difficult to reverse this decision later on.
Not only should investors value the participation decision in terms of value
appreciation, but also in terms of the disadvantages such as the lack of
liquidity which implies that they have to maintain their relation with the firm
for the entire holding period which could end only at the time of initial public
offer.
Secondly, due to rapid sales growth or a lack of external financing, small
firms have less liquid funds and thus are riskier them large firms. The eventual
pzirticipation in the ownership of small firms should be viewed as a contingent
issue. Bamea, Haugan, 8c Senbet (1985) argue that the convertibility of debt
is a put option, which can be exercised when the value of the firm falls below
the price of participation. However, the debt in the analysis is in fact default-
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free. The same option on financial assets of a small firm should be more
vulnerable and less likely to be exercised due to the high level of default risk.
Finally, most small firms are closely owned and controlled by entrepre
neurs. The stock of these firms is not publicly traded and the firm is not
required to reveal information to the public in exchange for financing.
Consequendy, outside investors are often less informed about the firm. This
makes participation less predictable since the participation decision depends
on the information available to investors at the time when the decision is
made. Although outside investors may m onitor the activities of the inside
owners, the costs of these activities may reduce the efficiency of the monitor
activities unless at least one part of the cost can be passed to the owners
(Yazdipour & Song, 1991).
The structure of this paper is designed to incorporate these particularities
of small firms into the analysis. Section II discusses a valuation model of equity
participation financing for a firm with risky debt. The impacts of the liquidity
and possibility of bankruptcy on perk consumption is discussed. In Section
III, the opportunity for growth is added to the analysis. Growth may increase
future cash flows, but it may also reduce the firm’s liquidity. For small firms
which do not have access to public financing, high growth may mean high
risk and high opportunity cost for perk consumption. Section IV extends the
anal)«is to include asymmetrical information. The impacts of monitoring
costs on the participation decision and entrepreneur perk consumption will
also be examined. Finally, a discussion of the results obtained from the
previous sections is presented in Section V.
n . THE MODEL: nNANCING WITH OPTION OF PARTICIPATION
Under paiticipation financing, an outside investor provides a firm with debt
financing which may be converted into equity. This could be regarded as a
type of delayed equity financing with a put option which allows the investor
to exercise the debt claim and remain outside of the firm. Although this
option increases the value of the investment, the eventual benefit depends
on the firm’s ability to repay the debt claim. In other words, the ability of the
outside investor to exercise his right depends on the solvency of the firm.
Typically, such an investment may result in three different outcomes: the
investor participates in the ownership and becomes an owner of the firm; the
investor receives the full debt repayment and ends the relationship with the
firm; the firm defaults and the investor receives the cash flows generated by
the operations of the firm.
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The valuation model of participation financing presented in this section
integrates the three possible results in the analysis whose objective is to
examine the effects of the risk of default on the value of the option and more
importantly, on the entrepreneur perk consumption. The following assump
tions are used to develop the model:
1. The paper does not explicitiy discuss the investment decision. It
assumes that the project cannot be divided, thm the am ount of
financing required, B, is already given.
2. It is assumed that the contract allows the investor, if he wishes, to
participate in the ownership of the firm, at the end of the contract
period, by converting the debt into a proportion, a, of the firm ’s equity
at a stated price, C= rB + x where r is one plus the interest rate and %
a premium^
3. The eventual debt repayment depends on the firm’s cash flow at
maturity, Y, which is assumed to follow a stochastic distribution func
tion ^ y ) with a lower limit of k. Since the financing is unsecured the
firm has the option of defaulting.
A rational investor would choose to participate in the firm if and only if
F> C, By buying into the shares of the firm, the investor may hold a fraction,
a, of the firm’s ownership and receive the same fraction of the firm’s fiiture
cash flows. Note that the perks consumed by the entrepreneur, K, are usually
included in the operating costs. Thus the liquidity available to repay the debt is
the net cash flow Y Naturally, as the entrepreneur increases his perk
consumption, there will be less cash left to repay the debt; hence the likelihood
of defeult increases. Equation (1) below describes the conditions of defaiilt:
t) ^

Y -K
rB

(1)

iiY < r B + K
iiY > r B + K

Since the firm will default when the net cash flow is insufficient to cover
the debt service obligations the condition of full debt servicing is Y —K > rB .
Based on equation (1), the end-of-the-period value of wealth of the investor
and that of the entrepreneur can be written as Fand Ebelow:^
V=

( Y - K )fiY ) rfr+

J

rBf{Y) d Y + a

J

( F - b)f{Y )dY
(2 )

F [Y \d Y + r B + a \F {Y \d Y
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J ( F - b )f{Y )d Y - a J ( F - b)f{Y )dY
!

»

^

(3)

= ii:+jF[51dF-aJi?i(W
b

c

where c= C+ ^Tand b= K + rB. The first and second terms on the right hand
side of equation (2 ) indicate the value of the ordinary debt to the investor
while the last term in the same equation represents the value of the option.
On the other hand, the value of the entrepreneur wealth consists of his perk
consimiption and the value of the future cash flows, as shown in equation (3 ).
Intuitively, the incentive of perk consumption is associated direcdy with the
method of financing. In the case of straight equity financing, the cost of the
entrepreneur perk consumption K is shared between the entrepreneur and
the outside investor. The net benefit to the entrepreneur from perk consump
tion is the proportion of shares held by the investor. Thus for each dollar of
K, the wealth transferred to the entrepreneur is a . This can also be seen from
the optimal perk consumption of the entrepreneur:
||= F [ i ] + a ( l - f M )
In the case of straight equity financing, both F[ b] and c] should be set
equal to zero. Thus the marginal value of the entrepreneur’s perk consump
tion is a. U nder participation financing, the investor retains his option of
withdrawing from the firm and this provides him with a protection. For a
riskless firm or a relatively safe firm, the marginal benefit of perk consump
tion to the entrepreneur is a ( l this is obviously less valuable to the
entrepreneur than in the case of equity financing. It would appear that the
existence of the option allows the investor to capture some of the welfare
losses resulting from the entrepreneur’s excessive perk consumption. How
ever this is not always the case for a firm with risky debt. As the risk of default
increases, the investor will be less able to exercise his option while the
entrepreneur’s benefit for each dollar of perk consumption is the probability
of default, f t 6 ]. The entrepreneur’s incentive for perk consumption in
creases with the risk of default as long as the debt is not secured by other
assets of the entrepreneur. With a sufficiently high level of risk, the entrepre
neur’s perk consumption will not fall even if a participation clause is included
in the financing contract.
Although high risk of default encourages the owner-manager to increase
perk consumption, it is still possible to find an incentive-compatible contract
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for a risky firm by choosing the cost of financing, r, given the proportion of
shares held by the outside investors. From equations (3) and (4), it is possible
to find the condition which will insure that does not increase. Mathemati
cally, the participation financing is effective only when F [b \ < qlF [ c] . To
ensure that this model of financing is efficient in solving agency problem, the
marginal value of the perk consumption to the entrepreneur under the
contract mechanism should be non-positive such as:
dK

= ii’[^>*]+a(l-i5'[<f]) = 0

(5)

In exchange for lower perk consumption, the investor reduces the interest
rate charged on the debt in order to reduce F[b]; this consequendy would
tend to reduce incentives to transfer the cost of perks in the case of default
at a given level of the shares held by outside investors after the conversion.^

in.

EQUITY PARTICIPATION IN THE G RO W ra FIRM

As indicated in the previous section, the possibility of default dilutes the value
of the participation option and encourages entrepreneurs to consume more
perks. However, this result was obtained on the basis of an implicit assumption
that the entrepreneur does not have to consider any costs or penalties
associated with his perk consumption. The reality of perk consumption may be
more complex; the decision of perk consumption requires a carefol calculation
of the cost-benefit trade off. The particular trade off analyzed in this section is
between the current perk consumption and the future consumption based on
the opportunity for growth. Intuitively, the future perk consumption is closely
linked to the growth of the firm. When the firm is bankrupt, the entrepreneur
loses not only his capital but also future perk consumption. TTie high opportunity
cost associated with the firm’s growth potential should induce the entrepreneur
to reduce the current perk consumption.
High growth rate may also increase the risk of the firm. While publiclytraded firms may use external sources to finance growth, small and privatelyheld firms have to rely on their own funds. Frequently, small firms invest a
lai^e part, if not all, of the internally generated funds into projects which are
not expected to generate significant new cash flows until some time in the
future. Although investment in such projects allows small firms to grow, it
reduces the liquidity. The firm becomes more vulnerable and consequendy
the risk of default on its current debt may rise.
Suppose that a firm continues to reinvest a fixed amount, 6 , from its czish
flow, in new investment projects. The net cash flow at the debt maturity is, T
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= 7 - 8 . Consequently, the total value of the firm at that time is equal to its
net cash flow plus the residual value resulting from the growth opportunities,
Q= where 9 is a param eter to measure the value of the future cash flows
generated from the investment. U nder these assumptions, the value of the
entrepreneur’s wealth can be written as:
00

£= J ( r b

00

6

+ Q )fiX )d Y - a J ( r -

Q )j{Y )d Y + K

(6 )

c

and the entrepreneur’s optimal perk consumption can be written as
— =

+ a (l - F[c*]) - Q(1 - a ) f

(7)

where b* = 6 + 8 and c* = c + 8 . Note that F[b*] =
+ 8 ], is the probability of
default based on the cash flow net of perk consumption and investment?. It
is interesting to note that the usefulness of the participation option in
reducing the perk consumption depends on the balance of the two opposing
effects which result from high g ro v ^ . Each time the investment in a growth
project increases, it absorbs cash flow which could otherwise be used to repay
debt. The higher default risk which results from cash flow shortfall allows the
entrepreneur to benefit from a more valuable wealth transfer. However, this
also makes current perk consumption more costiy since the total expected
loss is equal to Q x
For each dollar of perks consumed currently, the
entrepreneur loses Qf[b*] w here/[i^] is the marginal probability of default
derived from additional perk consumption. Thus the high growth potential
may serve as a self-imposed penalty on current consumption. The last term
of equation (7) shows this effect. Since
depends on both the size of
investment and the expected return on the investment projects, the entre
preneur whose firm has a more profitable project will be more cautious in
choosing his perk consumption in order to avoid losing Q. This is the result
which cannot be obtained with straight equity financing since in that case the
value of /should be equal to zero thus the marginal benefit of perk consump
tion will not be affected by the opportunity for growth.

IV. EQUITY PARTICIPATION UNDER ASYMMETRICAL
INFORMATION
One issue which often arises in dealing with the agency problems such as perk
consumption is that the subject is not always directly observable. This is
particularly true in case of small firms where information is somewhat difficult
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to obtain. Small firms are usually private and few sources of information on
them are available to the public. Even when information is produced in order
to obtain financing from outside investors, it is often incomplete. Thus the
owner-manager may possess inside information permitting him to benefit
when dealing with outside investors.
An investor may attempt to design a particular participation financing
contract to eliminate incentives to excessive perk consumption by the entre
preneur. But as indicated previously in equation (5), this can be done only
in the context of perfect information where the investor knows the entrepre
neur’s exact objective function. When the objective function is unknown, the
investor cannot predict the perk consumption, thus the contracting process
should follow a different framework as below:
-,

T/

A

M ax V -:r^= 0.
r, s.t.

The entrepreneur maximizes the value of his wealth while the investor is
looking for the optimal solution based on the partial information available
to him. The decision variable is the interest rate, r. Given asymmetrical
information on the part of the entrepreneur, the investor is unable to design
an incentive compatible contract; thus the entrepreneur can increase his perk
consumption without worrying about the reaction from outside investors.
Although some information is not available to the outside investor, it
could be obtained at a cost. This implies that the investor spend time and
money to monitor the activities of the entrepreneur in a timely fashion. The
monitoring activities may allow the investor to identify the entrepreneur
incentives and prevent the expropriation of the value of the firm by the latter.
The monitoring, however, is costly, especially for the investors who hold the
portfolios which include large number of small firms®. The monitoring
activities and their cost may exert an important impact on both inside owner
and outside investors, especially because the monitoring cost may act as a
barrier to the participation: the investor may not exercise his participation
option if the potential gain is not sufficient to cover the monitoring costs.
Past experience concerning the convertible debt of large firms suggests that
in a significant number of cases, the debt was not converted even diough the
value of the underlying assets was significandy higher than the exercise price.
This implies the existence of an implicit exercise premium set by investors
(Asquith &: Mullins, 1991).
Suppose that monitoring activities can reduce current perk consumption
by a particular percentage, s, which is a positive function of the monitoring
cost, g. Knowing the value of g, the outside investors increases the threshold
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of participation such that d = c + g. With these modifications, the entrepre
neur’s objective function becomes
oo

oo

E = il-s )K + j{Y * -b + Q )J ir )d r -a j{r -b -g + Q )fiY * )d r .
b
<f

(9)

The solvency of the firm at maturity is determined by the liquidity of the
firm y while the investor’s participation is based not only on the exercise
price but also on the cost of surveillance. If the entrepreneur is assumed to
select his current perk consumption, then the optimal value of K w ill be based
on the following condition:
— = (1 - 5) +

+ (1 - a) (1 - F[t']) - d l - oc)/= 0.

(10)

Compared to equation (7), the optimal iiTfrom equation (10) is expected
to be lower because of the lower marginal value of perk consumption. The
existence of monitoring costs tends to make the investor more cautious when
deciding to participate and more inclined to claim debt repayment. To see
the impact of the monitoring cost, we take the partial derivative of the
equation (10) with respect to g.
g = - ..- ( l- a ) /< 0 .

(11)

Interestingly, the cost of monitoring reduces the possibility of the partici
pation and therefore the incentive of entrepreneur perk consumption. The
explanation of this result is fairly straightforward: the high costs of monitoring
reduces the likelihood of equity participation of outside investors hence the
effect of wealth transfer is weaker. In firms with high levels of monitoring cost
which results from a high degree of information asymmetry, the existence of
the option allows outside investors, as potential shareholders, to exercise
pressure on the entrepreneur to reduce perk consumption. If the entrepre
neur wishes to maintain the outside financing, he has no choice but to release
more information to the public. This may help to reduce monitoring costs
and to increase the likelihood of investors participation. Either way, the
investors will benefit.

V. CONCLUDING REMARKS

The entrepreneur-owner of a small firm will benefit from the excessive perk
consumption as long as outside investors hold shares in the firm. To finance
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projects, small firms often use financial instruments which include an equity
participation option. When the investors have the option to choose between
claiming debt repayment and buying shares in the firm, the participation is
contingent. Although the usefulness of this particular form of financing in
reducing the owner-manager’s perquisite consumption in large firms is
understandable, its effectiveness in small firms is less obvious.
Outside investors can choose to hold debt claim and not to participate in
the firm as shareholders and not to share the cost of perks, but they still have
to bear at least part of the cost if the firm defaults on the debt at maturity. As
long as somebody else will pay part of the bill the entrepreneur is encouraged
to consume more perks. Thus participation financing is effective in dealing
with the issue of perk consumption only when the default risk of the firm is
low.
In general, the value of the firm increases with its growth rate. However,
this is true only for firms which finance growth with external funds. Small
firms usually have to rely on internal sources of financing to realize growth.
The entrepreneur’s future revenue and perk consumption are linked direcdy
to the firm’s growth potential. Rapid growth reduces the firm’s liquidity and
increases the risk of default. Thus the opportunity cost of perk consumption
to the entrepreneur becomes more expensive. Growth may act as a self-imposed
penalty which forces the entrepreneur to reduce perk consumption. With
straight equity financing the entrepreneur may be less concerned with the
risk of default. The use of the participation financing introduces the possibil
ity of default and increases the opportunity cost of entrepreneur perk con
sumption thus giving the outside investor some measure of protection.
Unless they can find the means to protect themselves against unpredicted
events, investors will be less likely to participate in the firm when there is no
sufficient information. Constant monitoring over the inside-owner’s activities
by outside investors may offer some protections from being manipulated and
expropriated. But the cost of such activity reduces the likelihood of investor
participation in the firm. In this context, the entrepreneur has no choice but
to reduce the consumption of perquisites or to release more information on
his ex-post behavior in order to calm the investors’ fears. O ther things being
equal, financing with an option of participation should have stronger effects
on entrepreneur perk consumption in firms with high degrees of information
asymmetry. Moreover, the choice of this particular method of financing may
also play a role in information signalling. For the entrepreneur who is not
well known to investors, the use of participation financing may allow him to
convince the investors and reduce the cost of financing.
The results of this paper may provide useful suggestions on the future
direction of empirical studies. The potential future researches could concen-
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txate on the three hypotheses raised in this paper. It would be interesting to
test the impacts of three exogenous variables on the use of participation
financing as a solution to the agency problem: probability of default, growth
rate of sales revenue and the proportion of the stocks controlled by insideowner. Such research may include firms of different sizes in an attempt to
identify the existence, if any, of small firm effects. The timing of participation
is also an im portant factor determining the effectiveness of participation. This
article has analyzed the case of a European option where the investors can
only choose at debt maturity. A further theoretical study may examine the
more robust case of the American option and see dynamic relation between
the perk consumption and the decision of participation.
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NOTES
1.

This implies that the proportion o f equity held by the debtholder after participation is
exogenously given, based on the value o f debt and that o f the equity at the time o f
contract negotiation.

2.

Obviously, the perk consumed by the entrepreneur should be always less than the
minimum cash flow k, at the lower limit o f the distribution.

3.

Equation (2) presented in the text is obtained from the results developed below:

b
y=

CO

oo

j ( F - K)f(Y)dY+ J rBf(Y)dY+ a | ( 7 k

b

h

b

=

b)f{Y)dY

b
oo

oo

r ^ f ( Y ) d Y + j r B f ( Y ) d Y + j r B f ( Y ) d Y + a j ( Y - b)f(Y)
k
b
c

k
b

= - \ { b - Y)f{Y)dY+ rB+ a

J(F - b ) f m Y

= - \ F \ , Y \ d Y + r B + a.\F[Y\dY.
k

C

Equation (3) is obtained in a similar way.
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4.

The percentage o f shares held by an outside investor has a direct impact on the
effectiveness o f participation financing. Usually, the entrepreneur will benefit more
when a larger proportion o f the shares is held by outside investors who cannot
participate in perk consumption but will share the costs. However, the existence o f the
option reduces the benefit by a proportion o f (xF[c] . It is easy to see that the impact of
the option increases with the proportion o f outside equity participation.

5.

The ability o f repaying debt is based on the cash available. The firm cannot refinance
its debt at maturity. This, however, is a very restrictive condition. In reality, the firm
might be able to obtain financing given that its future growth is promising.

6.

In their study, MacMillan, Kulow, and Khoylian (1988) found that many institutional
investors, mainly venture capitalists, are usually involved in the financial aspects of the
firms which they invested. Their involvement in the other aspects o f the firms are,
however, limited.

REFERENCES
Ang, J. S. (1991). Small business uniqueness and the theory o f financial management./owma/
of Small Business Finance, 1, 1-13.
Ang, J. S. (1991). On the theory of privately held finns. Journal of Small Business Finance, i,
185-203.
Asquith, P., Sc Mullins, D. W. (1991). Convertible debt: Corporate call policy and voluntary
comer^ion. Journal ofFinance, 4 6 ,1273-1289.
Bamea, A., Haugen, R. A., 5c Senbet, L. W. (1985). Market imperfections, agency problems
and financial contracting. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, NJ.
Bink, M. R., Ennew, C. T., 8c Reed, G. V. (1992). Information asymmetries and the provision
o f finance to small firms. International Small BusinessJournal, 11, 35-46.
Chua, J., Sc Woodward, R. S. (1993). Splitting the firm between the entrepreneur and the
venture capitalist with the help o f stock o^Xions^, Journal of Business Venturing, 8, 43-58.
Constand, R. L., Osteryoung, J. S., Sc Nast, D. (1991). Revolving assets-based lending contracts
and the resolution of debt-related agency problems./owma/ of Small Business Finance, 1,
15-28.
Dunstant, K, Dwyer, D., Sc Helmes, S. (1992). The small business funding debate: an empirical
review. International Research Symposium on Small Firm Finance, Baylor University, Waco, TX.
Green, R. (1984). Investment incentives, debt and warrants./owryiaZq/'Frnawcia/JE'conowics, 13,
115-136.
Jensen, M., Sc Meckling, W. (1976). Theory o f firm, management behavior, agency costs and
ownership structure./owmaZ ofFinancial Economics, 13, 305-360.
Long, M., Sc Sefcik, S. E. (1990). Participation financing: A comparison o f the characteristics
o f convertible debt and straight bonds issued in conjunction with warrants. Financial
Management, 19, 23-34.
MacMillan, I. C., Kulow, D.K., Sc Khoylian, R. (1988). Venture capitalists’ involvement in their
investments: extent and ^^Tiorm?incc. Journal of Business Venturing, 4,
Mehran, H. (1992). Executive incentive plans, corporate control, and capital structure./owma/
ofFinancial and Quantitative Analysis, 27, 539-560.
Schnabel, J. A. (1992). Small business capital structure choice. Journal ofSmall Business Finance,
2, 13-21.

Participation Financing and Perk Consumption

227

Stacy, R. L, (1988). Mezzanine lending: A primer for asset-based
Journal of Commercial
Bank Lending, 71, 54-66.
Yazdipour, R., & Song, M. H. (1991). Optimal management contracting, agency problem and
the size o f the firm: A background analysis. In R. Yazdipour (Ed.) Advances in small business
finance, Boston, MA: Kluwer Academic Publishers.

